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On 9 November 2026, Lord Garnier KC asked the Government in the House of Lords what it was doing, alone and with other INTERPOL member countries, to stop Russia abusing Red Notices and Diffusions. He quoted my recent article in The Times, in which I wrote that “Russia has been the worst offender for years”. He then asked the Minister to make sure no Russian Red Notice or Diffusion is published until it has been examined in detail. I am grateful for the mention. The exchange is worth reading closely, because the Government’s answers show exactly where the gap lies.
The Home Office Minister, Lord Hanson of Flint, told the House that the Government takes any misuse of INTERPOL’s systems “extremely seriously”. It will work with the National Crime Agency, INTERPOL and like-minded countries to strengthen safeguards against abuse, including by Russia. He said three things about the current safeguards:
Where breaches occur, he said, it is for INTERPOL to act rather than the UK Government.
Lord Garnier replied that this gave the impression of a Government “being a little passive”, and asked the Minister to move the matter “up a gear”. He was right to.
Review of Red Notices before publication exists and matters. Diffusions are a different matter. One national central bureau sends a Diffusion directly to others, and it is reviewed only after it has already reached foreign police forces. And checks at the front door are only as good as their results. Leaked INTERPOL data reported by the BBC in January showed about 90 per cent of Russian requests clearing initial checks in 2024. Over the same period, the CCF was overturning roughly half of the Russian cases brought before it.
Not every Russian Red Notice is abusive. Russia remains a member of INTERPOL, and some of its requests concern ordinary crime. The difficulty is the political and corporate-raiding cases that get through.
This is the part the debate did not reach. The United Kingdom, for very good reason, does not act on Russian Red Notices and does not cooperate with Russian extradition requests. Much of Europe does the same. A person living in London who is the subject of a Russian notice is therefore safe at home.
They cannot travel. And they cannot obtain a judicial decision discharging them, because no extradition hearing ever takes place. In many CCF applications, a court judgment refusing extradition is the strongest evidence available. UK-based clients have nothing like it to put forward.
In several cases I have seen, the UK has also not told INTERPOL that it received an extradition request or a Red Notice for the person concerned. INTERPOL is left without information that would support deletion, and the notice stays where it is. As a result, many clients in the UK who face politically motivated or corporate-raiding notices have been left in limbo.
The Minister is correct that INTERPOL governs itself. But INTERPOL acts on what member countries tell it, and the UK controls what its own national central bureau reports to Lyon. The NCA could routinely tell the General Secretariat when it receives a Russian request it will not act on. The CCF would then have material it currently lacks, in the cases of people the UK has already chosen to protect. That needs no vote at the General Assembly.
Anyone in the UK affected by a Russian notice can read our guide on how to remove a Red Notice, or contact us in confidence.
Leadership on INTERPOL abuse can begin with the UK’s own files.
The full exchange is recorded in Hansard and can be read here.
Red Notice Monitor launches Back to Basics series to ensure our readers understand the essential elements of Interpol and Red Notices before dealing with the complexities.
