A Numbers’ Game Part 2: The Numbers keep growing

Recently, the Red Notice Monitor published a piece in which we warned about the worrying number of Interpol’s registrations of Red Notices and the likely trend of authoritarian regimes to use this tool of international police cooperation as a means of repression against their opposition. This trend continues. In 2024, INTERPOL’s Red Notice system reached an unprecedented peak, issuing 15,548 notices, marking the highest annual total ever recorded.

These notices, pivotal for international police cooperation, cement the system’s role as a cornerstone of global law enforcement. Yet, the Notices and Diffusions Task Force (‘NDTF’) rejected or cancelled 2,462 notices and diffusions, a 54% increase from 2023’s 1,598, setting a record. Notably, this figure aligns closely with the 2,411 cases processed by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (‘CCF’) in 2024, many of which involved the deletion of notices. This convergence highlights both rigorous scrutiny and persistent compliance challenges, exposing vulnerabilities in a system critical to international security.

Red Notices, which alert member countries to the arrest of individuals for extradition, increased to 15,548, highlighting their crucial role in combating transnational crimes such as cybercrime, terrorism, and human trafficking in an increasingly interconnected world. Blue Notices, used to gather information on individuals and as a valuable tool for police cooperation against transnational crime, saw modest growth, rising to 3,700.

The NDTF’s 2,462 rejections—111 for human rights violations, 194 for Article 3 political, military, religious, or racial motives, and 2,157 for “other grounds” (88% of refusals)—signal heightened oversight of the requests for police cooperation sent by States to Interpol. Furthermore, he ambiguous “other grounds” category, encompassing procedural issues such as incomplete documentation or insufficient crime severity, obscures specific rejection reasons, potentially concealing political misuse.

The NDTF’s 2,462 rejections closely mirror the CCF’s 2,411 processed cases, many of which involved notice removals due to individual challenges, suggesting consistent non-compliance across both pre- and post-publication stages. This remarkable alignment, with only a 51-case difference, underscores systemic issues, as “we have warned in Part 1 of this series: the system is ‘vulnerable to misuse,’ particularly by authoritarian regimes targeting dissidents or journalists under the guise of criminal charges.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between these two mechanisms for reviewing Interpol’s notices. The NDTF function is to screen Red Notices and diffusions pre-publication, seeking to ensure compliance with INTERPOL’s legal framework. Diffusions, sent directly to National Central Bureaus (NCBs), are flagged as pending review to prevent premature action. The CCF, by contrast, addresses post-publication challenges from individuals contesting notices. The near-identical NDTF (2,462) and CCF (2,411) figures suggest that compliance issues persist beyond initial screenings, with individuals uncovering violations—such as politically motivated notices—that mirror NDTF findings. However, the 2024 NDTF statistics exclude CCF outcomes, which are reported separately, thereby fragmenting the compliance picture and limiting insights into the full scope of misuse. This disconnect hampers efforts to address systemic flaws, as post-publication challenges often reveal issues missed during pre-publication reviews.

The lack of country-specific data on rejected notices remains a critical gap. While the NDTF does not identify the countries whose notices have been removed, the CCF does so, although with a limited scope. Without specifying which member states submit non-compliant requests, patterns of abuse—especially politically motivated notices targeting activists or critics—go undetected.

Furthermore, the recently published figures indicate a system under strain, with both bodies catching significant non-compliance, from procedural errors to potential political abuse. This strain is compounded by the system’s complexity: 190 member states, diverse legal systems, and varying NCB capacities create inconsistencies in the quality of notices. Politically motivated notices, often disguised as legitimate criminal requests, erode trust in Interpol, particularly when targeting vulnerable groups like refugees or opposition figures. The CCF’s role in correcting these post-publication is vital, yet its limited integration with NDTF data obscures the full extent of misuse.

To strengthen the system, Interpol could pursue several reforms. For instance, identifying countries with high rejection rates under Article 3 could guide targeted interventions. Moreover, disaggregating the “other grounds” category into specific issues—such as documentation errors, insufficient evidence, or suspected political motives—would clarify rejection patterns and expose abuse.

Additionally, consolidating NDTF and CCF data into a single annual report would provide a comprehensive overview of compliance, bridging the gap between pre- and post-publication insights. Bolstering NDTF resources, such as staffing or, why not, AI-driven screening tools, could enhance pre-publication reviews, particularly for notices from countries with histories of misuse. AI could flag linguistic or contextual indicators of political motives, reducing reliance on vague categories. Interpol could finally improve on its collaboration with human rights organisations, and legal experts could refine guidelines to deter abuse while preserving the system’s effectiveness.

Additional measures could include capacity-building programs for NCBs to improve notice quality and reduce procedural errors. Workshops or online training modules could standardise documentation practices across member states, addressing the high volume of “other grounds” rejections. Interpol could also launch public awareness campaigns to educate stakeholders on the proper use of notices, emphasising compliance with Articles 2 and 3. These steps, combined with technological investments, would enhance the system’s resilience against abuse.

Interpol’s 2024 Red Notice data, with 15,548 notices issued and 2,462 NDTF rejections—mirrored by 2,411 CCF cases—reflects a vital yet challenged tool. The NDTF-CCF figure alignment underscores widespread compliance issues, from procedural lapses to potential political abuse. Addressing transparency gaps, unifying data, and implementing reforms are crucial to ensuring that Red Notices serve justice, not agendas. By adopting these measures, Interpol can fortify its system, maintaining its role as a linchpin of global law enforcement while safeguarding fairness and accountability.

—

Image: via Unsplash by Nicholas Cappello

—

Thanks to Cristian González Ruiz for assisting in the research and drafting of this blog.

Cristian is a Colombian-qualified lawyer and International Consultant with experience in strategic litigation before national and international tribunals. He was awarded Pro-Bono Lawyer of the year in 2021. Cristian holds an Advanced LL.M. in Public International Law (Cum Laude) from Leiden University, LL.M in International Law, BA in Political Science and J.D. (eq.) in Law by Universidad de Los Andes (Colombia).