How Türkiye’s Authoritarian Agenda Is Corrupting Interpol’s Red Notice System

Nearly a decade after the coup attempt in July 2016, the Turkish government’s domestic crackdown has evolved into a sprawling transnational campaign – not only against those it deems enemies of the state, but also against the very integrity of international policing. Despite mounting international criticism, Türkiye continues to flood Interpol with politically motivated requests and carry out returns through unofficial channels, violating basic principles of due process and international cooperation.

At Red Notice Monitor, we have extensively documented the abuse of Interpol’s systems by authoritarian states, including Türkiye, Russia, China, and others. Our blog contains numerous examples of how red notices are being used to hunt down dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders across borders. Turkish authorities have also used Blue Notices and the Stolen Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) system to target political opponents. Türkiye has emerged as one of the most persistent and prolific offenders attempting to recast political persecution as legitimate law enforcement.

The Numbers Tell the Story
In a statement delivered on 15th July 2025, marking the ninth anniversary of the attempted coup, Turkish Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç revealed the extent of Ankara’s global campaign. According to official government sources, Türkiye has:

• Submitted 3,579 red notice requests to Interpol targeting alleged members of the Gülen Movement,
• Filed 2,364 extradition requests to 118 countries,
• Secured the return of 131 individuals, 128 through informal deportations, and just 3 via official extradition channels.

This candid admission by the Turkish government is damning. These numbers illustrate how Türkiye has developed a two-track strategy of transnational repression: one formal (via Interpol and courts), and one informal (via politically pressured deportations, opaque detentions), with both designed to bypass judicial safeguards. The fact that only three extraditions occurred through lawful channels, while 128 were achieved through unofficial channels, highlights the alarming trend of transnational repression through forced returns.

Legal Laundering of Political Repression
The Turkish government’s frustration with Interpol’s checks and balances is no secret. Ali Yildiz, lawyer and director of the Arrested Lawyers Initiative, summarised the figures on X, quoting the Justice Minister:
“We requested 3,579 red notices from Interpol for members of the Gülen Movement. He added, ‘Unfortunately, we regret to see that Interpol has not taken our red notice requests into consideration, as if they were political criminals.’”

The Erdogan government labelled the Gülen movement as a ‘terrorist organisation’ since the coup attempt in 2016. What Türkiye characterises as counterterrorism is, in reality, a campaign to silence critics and perceived opponents, particularly those affiliated, real or alleged, with the Gülen Movement. In 2021, Interpol began pushing back on Türkiye’s red notice requests. Most were blocked by Interpol’s Commission for the Control of Files (CCF), under Article 3 of Interpol’s Constitution, which strictly prohibits the intervention in matters of a political, military, religious, or racial character – a core safeguard designed to prevent precisely the kind of political misuse that Türkiye exemplifies.

But Turkish authorities have not stopped. Instead, they’ve adapted.

A recent investigation by Nordic Monitor revealed a secret strategy developed by Turkish officials to bypass Interpol’s scrutiny by disguising political charges as ordinary crimes. A leaked document shows plans to reframe politically motivated requests using non-political charges such as financial crimes, e.g., tax evasion and fraud, or “membership in a criminal organization” to slip through the CCF’s review.

A Test for Interpol
Interpol’s credibility hinges on neutrality. When it becomes a vehicle for authoritarian states to pursue exiled dissidents and journalists, its foundational principles are eroded. As long as red notices can be requested en masse, and informal deportations continue to be rewarded, the system remains vulnerable.

To its credit, Interpol has made efforts in recent years to prevent such abuse. It has strengthened the review authority of its Commission for the Control of Files (CCF), which is tasked with screening red notice requests. But as Türkiye’s continued efforts show, determined regimes will continue testing these safeguards and probing for weaknesses.

The misuse of red notices not only threatens Interpol’s credibility, but it can have life-altering consequences for targeted individuals. A red notice, even one later deleted, can lead to travel bans, frozen bank accounts, job losses, and prolonged detentions. The process becomes the punishment.

At Red Notice Monitor, we believe that more must be done – not only by Interpol, but by national governments, courts, and international organisations:

• Interpol must continue rejecting politically motivated red notice requests and increase transparency around which states are abusing the system.
• Courts and governments must treat extradition requests from authoritarian states with extreme scrutiny, and resist informal channels that undermine due process.
• International watchdogs must investigate the use of renditions and other extrajudicial methods of forced return.
• Civil society and media must keep exposing these abuses, case by case, until systemic change is enforced.

This is not just about Türkiye. It is about whether global institutions will stand firm or bend to authoritarian pressure.

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Photo: Salah Darwish on Unsplash